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Note
Wiping the Slate Clean: Expunging Records of
Disability-Caused Misconduct as a Reasonable
Accommodation of the Alcoholic Employee
Under the ADA
Gloria Y. Lee*
William Singer was a dispatcher in the communications
center of the United States Capital Police.' Although his su-
pervisors commended him for excellent work, he experienced
difficulties in his job.2 He had attendance problems and fre-
quently violated a "call-off' rule, which required officers who
request unscheduled leave to do so at least one hour before
their shifts are to begin.3 The source of his misconduct was his
alcoholism.'
As a result of numerous infractions of company policy,
Singer's employer issued him notices of discipline.' Singer ini-
tially denied having a drinking problem, but eventually dis-
closed that he was an alcoholic and voluntarily entered a re-
habilitation program. After recommending his removal, his
employer then offered him a last-chance agreement.7 The em-
ployer, however, refused Singer's request for "a firm choice and
a fresh start," which would have entitled him to a choice be-
tween treatment and discipline.8 Under such an agreement, if
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1994,
Swarthmore College.
1. Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Em-
ployment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter SSA].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. (relating that Singer disclosed to his employer that he was an
alcoholic and that his alcoholism caused him to violate the "call-off" rule).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Singer's employer proposed the last-chance agreement as an al-
ternative to his discharge. Id.
8. See id. (noting that the employer's version of the last-chance agree-
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Singer chose treatment, prior discipline would be rescinded
and all documentation of the discipline would be purged from
his personnel file.'
Singer subsequently brought suit under the Government
Employee Rights Act of 1991,0 which incorporates Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)." The administrative
board found that the employer failed to make reasonable ac-
commodations by declining to provide Singer with "a firm
choice and a fresh start."2 The Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that the ADA "does not require a retroactive accommo-
dation for a disability, which is what is meant by a fresh
start."3 Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no
need to expunge documentation concerning the discipline from
Singer's personnel records. 4 In arriving at its decision, the
court explicitly declined to adopt the reasoning of two federal
district courts that held otherwise.'5
By bringing his claim under the ADA, Singer participated
in an ever-growing area of litigation.' 6 Passed in 1990, the
ADA not only prohibits private employers from discriminating
against qualified individuals with disabilities, 7 but also re-
quires them to reasonably accommodate disabled individuals to
enable them to perform their jobs.'8 The ADA does not enu-
merate specific accommodations considered reasonable and
thus leaves the requirement open to much interpretation.
Courts and employers have struggled to determine when
an accommodation is reasonable and required by the ADA,
particularly when alcoholic employees engage in some sort of
misconduct related to their alcoholism. Some courts have up-
held employers' decisions to discipline misconduct arising from
ment did not provide for the "retroactive relief" of "a firm choice and a fresh
start").
9. See id. (describing Singer's version of the last-chance agreement,
which the Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices Independent Hearing
Board found appropriate as a reasonable accommodation).
10. 2 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
11. SSA, 95 F.3d at 1107.
12. Id. at 1104.
13. Id. at 1107.
14. Id. at 1109.
15. Id. at 1108.
16. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (asserting that ADA litiga-
tion is on the rise).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
18. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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the alcoholism. 19 Others have concluded that employers should
not rely on prior disability-caused misconduct related to alco-
holism, especially once the individual recovers from the alco-
holism.20 The result of this judicial inconsistency is a lack of
clear guidelines for employers to follow. Moreover, some cases
have left open the strong possibility that alcoholic individuals
will not receive reasonable accommodations. These shortcom-
ings are critical in light of alcoholic employees' tremendous im-
pact on the workplace 21 and the ADA's influence as a recent
and fast-growing area of employment discrimination law.22
This Note contends that courts should take a consistent
approach toward alcohol-caused misconduct and hold that al-
coholic employees should receive reasonable accommodation
based on the type of disability-caused misconduct in which
they engage. Part I discusses the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, the two primary pieces of legislation that provide federal
protection for disabled employees. Part I also discusses the
case law on alcoholism as a disability under the two statutes
and reviews the courts' treatment of misconduct that arises
from a disability. Part II critically examines the reasoning
courts use when analyzing disability-caused misconduct, with
special emphasis on how courts have failed to differentiate be-
tween distinct types of misconduct. Part Ill argues that em-
ployers and courts must distinguish between different types of
disability-caused misconduct, especially when considering ex-
punging records as a reasonable accommodation. Part In also
proposes that courts allow expungement of records as a rea-
sonable accommodation only under certain conditions. This
approach properly balances the legitimate interests of the em-
ployer in maintaining a safe and productive workplace with the
19. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describing the position
of the majority of courts regarding the discipline of misconduct arising from a
disability).
20. See infra note 106 and accompanying text (indicating that reasonable
accommodations include forgiving prior misconduct once the individual starts
rehabilitation).
21. For example, one study calculated lost revenue because of alcoholic
employees at over $50 billion annually. NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE
& ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SIXTH SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 22 (1987). Addi-
tionally, 10 to 25% of the American population is "sometimes on the job under
the influence of alcohol or some illicit drug." Federico E. Garcia, The Deter-
minants of Substance Abuse in the Workplace, 33 SOC. SCI. J. 55, 56 (1996).
22. See infra note 39 and accompanying text (predicting the ADA's im-
mense impact).
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larger policy goal of eliminating employment discrimination
against the disabled by providing reasonable accommodations.
I. ALCOHOLISM AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. THE ADA: EXTENDING THE PROTECTION OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT
Individuals with disabilities find protection from employ-
ment discrimination in two different federal statutes: the Re-
habilitation Act of 197323 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).24 While the substantive provisions are similar in
both,25 Congress enacted the ADA because too many disabled
employees were not covered by the Rehabilitation Act, which
only applies to federal employers. 26 By prohibiting discrimina-
tion by private employers, the ADA greatly expanded the fed-
eral prohibition of employment discrimination against the dis-
abled.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Attempting to Eradicate
Discrimination Against the Disabled in the Public
Workplace
As the first piece of major legislation to address discrimi-
nation against the disabled,2 7 the Rehabilitation Act of 197328
"aimed at improving the lot of the handicapped"29 and specifi-
cally sought to eliminate barriers that the disabled faced in the
public workplace." The Act prohibits federal government em-
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
25. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (describing the relation-
ship between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
26. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (indicating that Con-
gress enacted the ADA because of the Rehabilitation Act's limited coverage of
only federal employees).
27. This Note uses the term "disabled" rather than "handicapped." For an
explanation of why the term "disabled" is preferred, see 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104
(1996). Congress uses the term "disability" in the statutory language of the
ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (stating that "[n]o covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual with a disability"). Congress later
amended the Rehabilitation Act and substituted "disability" for "handicaps."
See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-569, § 10 2 (p)(3 2 ),
106 Stat. 4346, 4360 (1992).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-94.
29. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,-626 (1984).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (noting that one of the Act's purposes was to em-
power individuals with disabilities to maximize employment opportunities);
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ployers and contractors3' from discriminating against qualified
individuals with disabilities.3 ' The Act also places an affirma-
tive obligation on the employer to accommodate disabled em-
ployees and to promote the employment of individuals with
disabilities.33 To comply with the Act, federal agencies must
structure their policies and programs to afford disabled em-
ployees equal opportunities in both job assignments and pro-
motions. 34
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Broadening
Protection Against Discrimination for the Disabled to the
Private Workplace
Recognizing the importance of prohibiting employment
discrimination against the disabled in both the public and pri-
see also Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 632 (suggesting that "enhancing em-
ployment of the handicapped was.., the focus of the 1973 legislation"); Tho-
mas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEY. L. REV. 759, 761 (1992)
(describing the law as "an effort by Congress to increase the opportunities for
employment [for] disabled individuals by promoting vocational training and
social services and by outlawing employment discrimination against the dis-
abled").
31. The Act is limited to federal government employees and recipients of
federal grants. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 794 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id.
32. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a "qualified handicapped
person" as "a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job in question." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1)
(1996). Unlike the statutory language in the Rehabilitation Act, which now
refers to "qualified individuals with disabilities," the Code of Federal Regula-
tions continues to refer to qualified "handicapped" persons.
33. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979);
Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1993); Shirey v.
Devine, 670 F.2d 1188, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (requiring
federal agencies to submit an affirmative action plan for the "hiring, place-
ment, and advancement of individuals with disabilities in such department,
agency, or instrumentality" that "shall include a description of the extent to
which and methods whereby the special needs of [handicapped] employ-
ees ... are being met"); id. § 793(a) (stating that federal contractors "shall
take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities").
34. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir.
1981) (citing Ryan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 565 F.2d 762, 763 (D.C. Cir.
1977)).
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vate sectors, 35 Congress passed the ADA36 in 1990. The ADA
currently applies to all employers with fifteen or more employ-
ees.37 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
is responsible for enforcing Title I of the ADA, which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of a disability.38 It has
been called "the most sweeping civil rights legislation since the
Civil War era,"39 reflecting the remedial purpose of the statute
to encourage conscious efforts to eliminate all discrimination
against the disabled."
Because the provisions of the ADA are still relatively
new,4 the full impact of the ADA on businesses is not yet
35. See Flynn v. Raytheon Co., 868 F. Supp. 383, 384 n.1 (D. Mass. 1994)(commenting that the ADA enlarges the scope of the Rehabilitation Act by ex-
tending remedies for handicapped discrimination against private employers);
Laura Hartman, Note, The Disabled Employee and Reasonable Accommoda-
tion Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act: Where Does Absenteeism Attrib-
utable to the Disability Fit into the Law?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 905, 907(1993) (recognizing that no federal protection existed for disabled persons in
the private workplace until passage of the ADA).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
37. Id. § 12111(5). The Act excludes from the ADA the following employ-
ers: the federal government, federal government corporations, Indian tribes,
and bona fide private membership clubs. Id.
38. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1996).
39. 135 CONG. REc. S10,714 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). Others have viewed the ADA as "the most significant disability legis-
lation in American history." Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 149, 149 (1992).
Still others have compared the ADA to the "Emancipation Proclamation." 135
CONG. REC. S10,765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
The impact of the ADA is immense, considering the 43 million disabled
Americans the Act potentially affects. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)
(documenting congressional findings that "some 43,000,000 Americans have
one or more physical or mental disabilities, and that this number is increasing
as the population as a whole is growing older").
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's (EEOC) regulations further describe the ADA as "an antidiscrimi-
nation statute that requires that individuals with disabilities be given the
same consideration for employment that individuals without disabilities are
given." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a). The ADA's simple, yet broad, objective is that
"people with disabilities be treated with dignity and respect by being judged
as individuals on the basis of ability rather than on the basis of irrational
fears or patronizing attitudes." Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: An Introduction for Lawyers and Judges, 29 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 175, 213 (1994).
41. President Bush signed the Act into law on July 26, 1990. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-213; 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1994); see also Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990). The ADA went into effect on July 26, 1992 for employers with 25
or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Employers with 15 to 24 em-
ployees were not included until July 26, 1994. Id.
ALCOHOLICS AND THE ADA
known,42 but ADA litigation is rapidly increasing.43 Noting
that Congress modeled the employment provisions of the ADA
after the employment sections of the Rehabilitation Act,'
courts have relied on judicial interpretations of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to interpret cases involving the ADA.45 Some commen-
42. See Hindman v. GTE Data Servs., Inc., No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994
WL 371396, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1994) (noting the "paucity" of cases in-
terpreting the ADA because of its recent enactment); Christopher & Rice, su-
pra note 30, at 760 (predicting the major impact of the ADA on the American
business community); Mullen, supra note 40, at 176 (recognizing that the full
ramifications of the ADA will not be apparent for some time).
43. ADA litigation is just now beginning to appear in courts because of
the requirement that plaintiffs first exhaust administrative remedies by filing
a charge with the EEOC before suing an employer. Mary E. Sharp, Note, The
Hidden Disability That Finds Protection Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act: Employing the Mentally Impaired, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 899, 901
(1996). According to the EEOC, complainants have filed more than 54,000
employment discrimination charges under the ADA between July 1992 and
the end of September 1995, with the EEOC filing 89 ADA-based lawsuits.
Lisa J. Stansky, Opening Doors, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 66.
44. Wendy Y, Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895, 895 (1992); see id.
at 903-04 (noting that most of the language in the two statutes is the same);
see also 136 CONG. REC. H2427-28 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement by Rep.
Owens) (indicating that the fimdamental concepts of the ADA are derived
largely from the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations); ADA
Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630)
(containing the EEOC's specific statement that the agency was guided by the
regulations of the Rehabilitation Act and the case law interpreting those
regulations in developing the regulations under the ADA).
45. See Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 n.2 (6th Cir.
1995) (accepting that the lower court's reasoning with respect to the Rehabili-
tation Act claim "applied with equal force" to the ADA claim since the protec-
tion offered by both Acts is the same); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d
828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 711 (1996) (indicating that
cases involving claims under the Rehabilitation Act are instructive to cases
involving the ADA and commenting that the legislative history of the ADA
indicates that Congress intended judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation
Act to be incorporated by reference when interpreting the ADA); McCullough
v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (determining
that "[tlhe federal policies behind the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are
similar"). Courts have also held that the substantive standards for determin-
ing liability are the same whether the suit is fied against a federally funded
employer under the Rehabilitation Act or against a private employer under
the ADA. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995). Since courts rely
on case law regarding the Rehabilitation Act to interpret the ADA and vice-
versa, this Note will likewise use case law on both statutes interchangeably.
Moreover, the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-569,
106 Stat. 4344 (1992), provide that courts are to interpret both laws in the
same manner with regard to employment discrimination claims. The amend-
ments provide that "[tlhe standards used to determine whether this section
has been violated in a complaint alleging nonaffirmative action employment
16471997]
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tators have observed, however, that unlike the Rehabilitation
Act, the ADA does not require that private employers give pri-
ority in hiring or promotions to disabled employees. a6
a. Title I: The Employment Provisions
Title I of the ADA47 attempts to balance the legitimate in-
terests of disabled individuals to be free from discrimination in
the workplace with the interests of private businesses and gov-
ernments, who have finite resources and capabilities. 48  To
achieve the ADA's comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against the disabled, courts may
need to compromise the legitimate interests of the employer in
maintaining a profitable business.49 Ultimately, the weighing
of interests involves a delicate and difficult task for the courts.
An ADA violation arises when an employer discriminates
against a qualified individual with a disability" in any aspect
discrimination... shall be the standards applied under title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990." 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1996). But see Voss,
supra note 44, at 908-11 (contending that courts should not automatically
adopt case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act in ruling on questions
presented under the ADA because the underpinnings of the Acts are differ-
ent).
46. See, e.g., Richard H. Nakamura, Jr., Pride and Prejudice in the Work-
place, FED. LAW., June 1996, at 22, 27 (arguing that the ADA is not an
"affirmative action statute"); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text
(discussing congressional intent that the federal government take affirmative
action to become the model employer for the disabled). But see Mullen, supra
note 40, at 180 (positing that the ADA is, in reality, an affirmative action law
since employers cannot passively achieve compliance with the ADA).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994). At the basis of the employment provi-
sions is the principle that those individuals with disabilities who are able to
perform the essential functions of a job, with or without reasonable accommo-
dations, should not be barred from employment opportunities because of a
disability. Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 763.
The ADA is comprised of two other sections. Title II forbids public enti-
ties, meaning any state or local government, from excluding or denying serv-
ices and benefits for disabled individuals because of that person's disability.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34; id. §§ 12141-65. Title III provides that places of public
accommodation may not discriminate on the basis of a disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations. Id. §§ 12181-89.
48. Nakamura, supra note 46, at 27.
49.. For an example of how employers may need to consider the interests
of a disabled employee over their own pecuniary interests when providing
reasonable accommodations, see infra text accompanying note 68. But see
text accompanying note 65 (explaining that certain accommodations are not
reasonable because they would impose an undue hardship on the employer's
business concerns).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (stating that the ADA only protects a
[Vol. 81:16411648
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of employment, including the application process, hiring and
advancement decisions, the discharge of employees, compen-
sation, job training, or any other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment.51 According to the ADA, a disability in-
cludes (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities 52 of such individ-
ual;53 (2) a record of such impairment in the past;54 or, (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment.55
"qualified individual with a disability," which means "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires").
51. Id. § 12112(a). The EEOC further detailed the various aspects of
employment to which Title I of the ADA applies. The coverage is broad and
includes any "term, condition, or privilege of employment." EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON
THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT, at VII-2 (1995) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL]. In
other words, once employees or applicants are deemed to be qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities, the ADA protects them from discrimination in vir-
tually "every phase of employment." Mullen, supra note 40, at 186.
52. The regulations define major life activities as functions "such as car-
ing for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(C).
54. Id. Congress added this category to the definition of a "disability" to
combat the effects of erroneous, but prevalent, views about individuals with a
record of a past disability. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 279 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
405-06 n.6 (1979)). Moreover, this part of the statutory definition reflects
Congress's desire to protect those who have recovered or are recovering from
a disabling condition. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 334 (noting that "[tihis provision is included ... in part
to protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or mental impair-
ment which previously substantially limited them"); S. REP. No. 101-116, at
23 (1989) (indicating the same); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (explaining the in-
tent of this provision to ensure that those with a history of disability are not
discriminated against).
The EEOC's interpretive guidance, contained in the Appendix that follows
the regulations promulgated by the EEOC, states that an employer will violate
this provision "if a record relied on by an employer indicates that the individual
has or has had a substantially limiting impairment." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3); id. app. § 1630;
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 6881 (Mar. 1995); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1)
(1996) (offering the same definition under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act).
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b. The Reasonable Accommodations Requirement
The heart of the ADA,56 and possibly the most controver-
sial part of the Act,57 is the "reasonable accommodations" re-
quirement.5 8  This provision requires employers59 not only to
refrain from disability-based discrimination, 60 but to make af-
firmative reasonable accommodations for the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability.
56. Nakamura, supra note 46, at 22.
57. Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 777. Determining what consti-
tutes a "reasonable accommodation" is predicted to be the subject of much de-
bate and litigation in the future. Lerblance, supra note 39, at 155. This is not
surprising since the term is an "open-ended" one, leaving considerable room
for different interpretations. Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996
(D. Or. 1994).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The best description of the general duty to
accommodate is that it requires looking toward the future for the best solution
for both the employer and the employee. Hartman, supra note 35, at 927.
59. Although all employers must strive to provide these reasonable ac-
commodations, courts hold federal employers, who are subject to the Rehabili-
tation Act, to a higher standard in providing accommodations. Carr v. Reno,
23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.D.C. 1994); see Voss, supra note 44, at 933 (contending
that courts should recognize that federal employers have a greater duty to ac-
commodate alcoholic employees than private employers and should thus treat
the two employers differently).
The rationale behind the higher standard is Congress's view that the fed-
eral government should be a model employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (1994)
(indicating that the federal government should play a "leadership role" in
promoting the employment of individuals with disabilities). The Code of Fed-
eral Regulations mandates that "[algencies shall give full consideration to the
hiring, placement, and advancement of qualified mentally and physically
handicapped persons. The Federal Government shall become a model em-
ployer of handicapped individuals. An agency shall not discriminate against a
qualified physically or mentally handicapped person." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703(1995). Legislative history on the Rehabilitation Act also suggests that the
federal government has a greater affirmative duty in the employment of the
disabled. See 95 CONG. REc. 30,347 (1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston)(indicating that Congress expected the federal government to be a leader in
the employment of handicapped individuals).
60. Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 777.
61. Id. The regulations define "reasonable accommodations" as:
i) [mlodifications or adjustments to a job application process that en-
able a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the
position such qualified applicant desires; or (ii) [miodifications or
adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circum-
stances under which the position held or desired is customarily per-
formed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform
the essential functions of that position; or (iii) [mlodifications or ad-justments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to
enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by
its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
1650 [Vol. 81:1641
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Under the statute, whether an accommodation is reason-
able depends on the particular circumstances of each case.6 2 No
duty to make reasonable accommodations for a disability ex-
ists, however, if an employer is unaware of the disability.63 Ac-
cordingly, an individual with a disability is responsible for in-
forming the employer of the disability and the need for an
accommodation.64
c. Employer Defenses: Undue Hardship and Direct Threat
The ADA excuses an employer from the reasonable ac-
commodation requirement if providing such accommodation
would be an "undue hardship" on the operation of the busi-
ness. s6 Employers must evaluate four factors when determin-
ing whether providing an accommodation would create an un-
due hardship: (1) the nature and cost of the accommodation, (2)
the financial resources of the employer,66 (3) the type of opera-
tion of the employer, and (4) the impact of the accommodation
on the operation of the facility.67 Even if an accommodation is
an undue hardship, the employer must provide as much of the
accommodation that would not constitute an undue hardship
and permit the disabled employee to provide the remainder.
68
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1996). The regulations also suggest how employers
should determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation given the cir-
cumstances. Employers should initiate an informal, interactive process
with the qualified individual with a disability in need of an accommodation.
Id. § 1630.2(o)(3). They should then attempt to identify the precise limits
arising from the disability and the possible accommodations that could over-
come those limitations. Id.
Given the broad, generic guidance in the regulations, the confusion over
what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is understandable. See supra
note 57 (describing the term "reasonable accommodation" as an open-ended
one that is causing much debate).
62. See supra note 61 (detailing the various, case-specific factors employers
should evaluate to find a reasonable accommodation of a disabled employee).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (imposing the duty to make reasonable
accommodations only of known disabilities); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (indicating
that an employer would not be expected to accommodate disabilities of which it
is unaware); see also Miller v. National Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th
Cir. 1995) (finding no duty of accommodation because the employee did not
inform the employer of her manic depression).
64. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34 (1989); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
66. Employers may have to incur substantial costs to accommodate an
individual with disabilities. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d).
67. Id. § 1630.2(p)(2).
68. Id. app. § 1630.15(d).
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To prove undue hardship, employers may not simply as-
sert that a proposed accommodation constitutes an undue
hardship.6 9 Rather, they must present objective evidence that
demonstrates that the accommodation will actually cause an
undue hardship. 0 An accommodation generally imposes an
undue hardship only if it is unduly costly or disruptive or
would fundamentally change the nature of the employer's obli-
gations."' Coworkers' fears or prejudices about a disability or
negative morale would not qualify as an undue hardship.72
The high standard of proof required by the ADA reflects Con-
gress's intent to place significant responsibility on employers to
provide reasonable accommodations.
Because an employer needs to ensure a safe workplace, the
ADA provides the employer with a "direct threat" or "safety"
defense to the charge of unlawful discrimination.74 Under this
defense, if an employee poses a direct threat 5 to the health or
safety of the employee or to others in the workplace, the em-
ployee is not protected under the ADA, and the employer may
discharge or discipline the employee. 6  The risk, however,
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 349; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 35 (1989); 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(p); Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 784.
72. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). But see Voss, supra note 44, at 947
(suggesting that employers should be able to consider the intangible effects of
an individual's alcoholism, like employee morale and productivity, in analyz-
ing undue hardship).
73. Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 783; see H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 68 (asserting that the ADA employs a higher standard than Title VII
that is "necessary in light of the crucial role that reasonable accommodation
plays in ensuring meaningful employment opportunities for people with dis-
abilities"); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (contending that the "duty to
provide reasonable accommodation... is a much higher standard than the
duty to remove barriers in existing buildings... and creates a more substan-
tial obligation on the employer").
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994).
75. Direct threat means "a significant risk of substantial harm to the
health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or re-
duced by reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Hence, it is im-
portant that employers first consider whether a reasonable accommodation
would decrease the risk of harm to an acceptable level. Employers must base
their determination on reasonable medical judgment and consider the follow-
ing factors: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the po-
tential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and, (4) the
imminence of the potential harm. Id.
76. John D. Thompson, Psychiatric Disorders, Workplace Violence and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 25, 69 (1995).
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must be significant and probable; a speculative or remote risk
is insufficient.7 In claiming a direct threat to safety, the em-
ployer must rely on objective, factual evidence rather than on
subjective perceptions or irrational fears.78 According to one
commentator, requiring objective evidence allows an employer
to consider only the individual's current condition.7 9
B. ALCOHOLISM AS A DISABILITY
Alcoholism is a recognized disability under the Rehabili-
tation Act 8" and the ADA.81 While the ADA does not explicitly
name alcoholics as a protected class,82 it specifically protects
recovered or recovering substance abusers. 3 This protection
77. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r). Many courts, however, have not followed
the EEOC's strict standard. Christopher G. Bell, ADA and FMLA Litigation
Results from Around the Country, in EMPLOYMENT LAW HANDBOOK 1, 4
(Minn. Bar Ass'n No. 1277, 1996). As a result, many employers have success-
fully raised the direct threat defense. Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. University of Md.
Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a neuro-
logical resident with HIV presented appreciable risk of catastrophic harm
which justified exclusion from the residency program); Bradley v. University
of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 3 F.2d 922, 955 (5th Cir. 1993)
(upholding involuntary reassignment of surgical technician with HIV because
of appreciable risk of catastrophic harm).
78. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r); see Mullen, supra note 40, at 191 (noting
the EEOC's cautioning that subjective perceptions, irrational fears, patroniz-
ing attitudes, or stereotypes about the nature or effect of a particular disabil-
ity or disability in general will not support a direct threat defense).
79. Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 790.
80. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 555 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th
Cir. 1990); Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d
140, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1987); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d
1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980); 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg.
22,686 (1977).
The 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act confirmed that Congress
intended qualified alcoholics to receive protection from discrimination. Mar-
jorie Shames Bertman, Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973: Protection Against Employment Discrimination for Alcoholics and Drug
Addicts, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 507, 515-16 (1979).
81. Schmidt v. Safeway, 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Or. 1994); Mackey v.
Cleveland State Univ., 837 F. Supp. 1396, 1411-12 (N.D. Ohio 1993); 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.16(b); EEOC TEcHNIcAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 51, § 8.4;
see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
333 (listing alcoholism as a disorder covered under the ADA); H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (same).
82. The statute never states that the ADA applies to alcoholics, although
case law and the regulations clearly indicate that alcoholics are covered. See
sources cited supra note 81.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1)-(2) (1994) (stating that the ADA neither
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prevents employers from discriminating against individuals on
the basis of their past substance abuse84 and rewards and en-
courages rehabilitation. 5  Consequently, employers may not
rely on the employee's status as an alcoholic as grounds for
discipline or discharge. The ADA, however, provides that an
employer may hold an alcoholic employee to the same qualifi-
cation standards for employment, behavior, or job performance
used for other employees, even if problematic performance or
behavior is related to the employee's alcoholism.8 6
1. Disability-Caused Misconduct
The majority of courts have held that an employer may
discipline a substance-addicted employee for misconduct, even
when that misconduct arises because of the substance addic-
tion.87 The premise behind these courts' reasoning is that the
excludes those who are rehabilitated and no longer engaging in substance
abuse nor those who are participating in a rehabilitation program and no
longer engaging in such use); cf. Grimes v. United States Postal Serv., 872 F.
Supp. 668, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (concluding that courts extend protection un-
der the Rehabilitation Act only to those who have successfully completed a
drug rehabilitation program or are currently in such a program and not using
drugs at the time); Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(finding that a rehabilitated drug or alcohol abuser is a protected individual
under the Rehabilitation Act).
The second prong of the statutory definition of "disability," namely having
a record of a substantially limiting impairment, also protects rehabilitated or
rehabilitating alcoholics. Christopher & Rice, supra note 30, at 770-71. Ac-
cordingly, if an employer relies on an individual's record of past alcohol abuse,
the employer may violate the ADA. See supra note 54 (explaining that a record
of a substantially limiting impairment qualifies as a disability and that an em-
ployer discriminates on the basis of the disability if relying on that record).
84. See Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079, 1080 (E.D. Ark. 1994)
(positing that the policy reason for protecting rehabilitated drug users is to
prevent employers from firing them solely on the basis of their past drug use).
85. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (indicating that protecting rehabilitated or rehabilitating drug
users is consistent with strong public policy of encouraging abusers to seek
treatment); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (approving
of including past drug abusers within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act
since, as a matter of public policy, Congress should provide assistance for
those who have overcome their addiction and give some incentive to those who
are attempting to overcome it).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
87. See, e.g., Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir.
1995) (indicating that an employer could lawfully discharge an alcoholic main-
tenance worker for driving drunk); Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d
843, 847 (6th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the distinction between discharging
someone for unacceptable misconduct and discharging someone because of the
disability); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995)
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ADA is not meant to shield disabled individuals from miscon-
duct and thereby discriminate in their favor,88 especially if the
misconduct is criminal or egregious in nature. 9 The majority
of courts, therefore, allow employer disciplinary action for mis-
conduct that results from a disability while prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of the disability itself.90 Nevertheless,
the question arises whether an employer who disciplines such
misconduct also discriminates against the individual on the
basis of the disability and consequently violates the ADA.91
Only the Second Circuit92 in Teahan v. Metro-North Com-
muter Railroad Co.93 has found in favor of the terminated em-
(finding that an employer terminated employees because of their drug-related
misconduct as opposed to their drug-addiction); Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 259
(4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that termination based on misconduct is distinct
from an employee's status as an alcoholic or drug addict); Taub v. Frank, 957
F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that an employee who was fired for his
addiction-related criminal possession of heroin was not protected by the Re-
habilitation Act).
88. See Despears, 63 F.3d at 637 (claiming that a refusal to excuse a dis-
abled person who commits a crime under the influence of the disability is not
discrimination against the disabled, but a refusal to discriminate in their fa-
vor); cf. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 909 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (D. Utah
1995) (commenting that Congress intended the ADA to prohibit unfair stereo-
types about the disabled, but not to shield the disabled from consequences of
misconduct).
89. See, e.g., Despears, 63 F.3d at 637 (arguing that a reasonable accom-
modation of an employee's disability should not require employers to overlook
infractions of the law); Maddox, 62 F.3d at 848 (concluding that employers
subject to the Rehabilitation Act and ADA must be allowed to take appropri-
ate action with respect to an employee on account of criminal or egregious
conduct, regardless of whether the employee is disabled); Wilber v. Brady, 780
F. Supp. 837, 840 (D.D.C. 1992) (indicating that those who engage in serious
misconduct will not find refuge in the Rehabilitation Act).
90. See, e.g., Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847 (arguing that the language of the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA "makes clear that such distinction is warranted");
Collings, 63 F.3d at 832 (recognizing a difference between termination be-
cause of misconduct and termination because of a disability); Little, 1 F.3d at
258 (noting that the issue of misconduct is distinct from status as an alcoholic
or drug addict).
91. For instances of terminated alcoholic employees making such claims,
see Despears, 63 F.3d at 636; Maddox, 62 F.2d at 846-47; Little, 1 F.3d at 257.
92. Several federal district courts have also offered the reasoning set
forth by the Second Circuit. See Hindman v. GTE Data Serv., Inc., No. 93-
1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 WL 371396, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1994) (accepting
that an employer relies on a disability when it justifies termination based on
conduct caused by the disability); Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077,
1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (asserting that the only logical interpretation of the Re-
habilitation Act is that if a disability manifests itself in certain behavior and
an employee is discharged because of that behavior, the individual has been
terminated solely because of the disability); Ham v. Nevada, 788 F. Supp. 455,
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ployee and held that misconduct caused by a disability is pro-
tected. 4 The court did not find persuasive the majority view's
distinction between lawful disciplining of misconduct and un-
lawful discriminating on the basis of the disability. 5 Hence,
the court held that when an employer terminates a disabled
employee because of misconduct that results from the disabil-
ity, the employer impermissibly discriminates on the basis of
the disability itself.9 6
Other courts have implied that if employee misconduct
arises as a direct result of the disability, employers cannot rely
on that misconduct in discharging the employee. 97 The Sev-
enth Circuit in Despears v. Milwaukee County98 suggested that
an employee would have prevailed on his claim if he could have
shown that his alcoholism was the sole cause of the misconduct
that resulted in the discharge.9 9 Courts have also denied an
ADA claim when a disability indirectly caused the miscon-
duct.1 0 In other words, a tenuous chain of causation between
459 n.4 (D. Nev. 1992) (purporting that being fired for behavior caused by
one's affliction is the same thing as being fired for one's affliction).
93. 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
94. See id. at 517 (holding that termination of an employee that was jus-
tified as being due to absenteeism caused by substance abuse was termination
"solely by reason of' that substance abuse).
In Teahan, an alcoholic employee brought a claim under the Rehabilita-
tion Act, alleging that he was terminated because of his excessive absentee-
ism, which was caused by his alcoholism. Id. at 514. The court observed the
legislative purpose in ensuring that rehabilitated or rehabilitating employees
are not discriminated against on the basis of past substance abuse and rea-
soned that employers should not rely on past substance abuse-caused miscon-
duct if the employee is undergoing rehabilitation or is successfully rehabili-
tated. Id. at 518.
95. See id. (asserting that discharge because of misconduct caused by a
disability is equivalent to discharge because of the disability).
96. See id. at 515 (holding that an employee who has excessive unexcused
absences from work as the result of alcoholism is terminated "solely by rea-
son" of his disability when the employer relies on the absenteeism to termi-
nate).
97. Some courts have suggested that discipline for misconduct that arises
as a direct result of a disability may violate the ADA. Cf., e.g., Florida Bar v.
Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 699 (Fla. 1995) (concluding that because the em-
ployee's misconduct was not a direct result of his bipolar disorder, sanctions
would not violate the ADA); Magruder v. Runyon, No. 94-3069, 1995 WL
311740, at *3 (10th Cir. May 22, 1995) (requiring employee to show a nexus
between the conduct and the alleged alcoholism to raise a factual dispute
whether she was terminated because of her disability).
98. 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 636.
100. See Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455, 463 (N.D.
Miss. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal chain be-
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the disability and misconduct will defeat an employee's claim
of discrimination based on the disability."10
2. Employee Defense of Addiction
When a federal agency discharges an employee for miscon-
duct resulting from substance abuse, courts allow employees to
rely on addiction as an affirmative defense. 2 To establish an
affirmative defense of addiction, terminated employees who
bring claims under the Rehabilitation Act must demonstrate
that they were under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the
time of the offense. 10 3 Employees must specifically show that
the substance abuse impaired them so badly that they lacked
control over their actions and diminished their capacity for ex-
ercising judgment at the time of the misconduct.' 4
3. Reasonable Accommodation of the Alcoholic Employee:
Expungement of Records
Consistent with the duty of accommodating other types of
disabilities, employers must provide reasonable accommoda-
tions to their current and rehabilitated alcoholic employees. 10 5
tween his disability and his firing). In Taylor, an epileptic employee, who was
terminated for fighting with a co-employee, alleged an ADA violation. Accord-
ing to the employee, "[he was fired for violating a company rule. He violated
a company rule because he was more volatile than usual. He was more vola-
tile than usual because he was taking Felbatol. He was taking Felbatol to
control his epilepsy." Id. Because the result was "four times removed" from
the disability, the court rejected the employee's claim. Id.
10L See Richardson v. United States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1215
(D.D.C. 1985) (rejecting plaintiffs claim because of a "tenuous chain of causa-
tion" between his alcoholism and his discharge). Richardson, an alcoholic
postal worker, was suspended and eventually terminated after he was
charged with assault with intent to kill his wife and himself. Id. at 1214.
Richardson claimed that he had been drinking heavily when he had commit-
ted the offense. Id. at 1215. The court noted that "[tjhe nexus between the
crime and the alcohol is ... conjectural." Id. The court then indicated that
"Richardson was discharged for his criminal conduct, not because of alcohol-
ism or poor job performance due to alcohol." Id. The court thus suggested
that firing an individual because of poor job performance caused by alcoholism
would be an actionable claim.
102. See Grimes v. United States Postal Serv., 872 F. Supp. 668, 675 (W.D.
Mo. 1994) (discussing the affirmative defense of addiction in a Rehabilitation
Act claim).
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Simms v. United States Postal Serv., 39 M.S.P.B. 308, 311
(1988)).
105. See Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Or. 1994)
(suggesting that employers must make a reasonable accommodation for an
alcohol problem); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 131 (D.D.C. 1984)
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The types of accommodations found reasonable by the courts
tend to center on encouraging and rewarding rehabilitation ef-
forts. 106 Some courts have held that forgiveness of prior alco-
hol-caused misconduct in proportion to the individual's will-
ingness to undergo rehabilitation and favorable response to
treatment is among the reasonable accommodations that an
employer should provide an alcoholic employee. 07 In Callicotte
(proposing that the Rehabilitation Act's reasonable accommodation provision
required federal employers to "exert substantial affirmative efforts to assist
alcoholic employees toward overcoming their handicap before firing them for
performance deficiencies related to drinking").
For example, employers may need to inform the employee of available
counseling as a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869
F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (recommending that employers who suspect that
an employee's poor job performance results from alcoholism should inform the
employee of available counseling). The ADA may also require employers to
offer leave without pay to an alcoholic employee who has already failed in
treatment, but has an opportunity and is willing to enter another rehabilita-
tion program. Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 137.
106. Employers must do more than simply treat the alcoholic employee
with great patience and tolerance under the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement. Burchell v. Department of the Army, 679 F. Supp. 1393, 1402
(D.S.C. 1988). It is unnecessary, however, that the employer recommend a
specific inpatient treatment program before discharging the employee. Fuller
v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990). Instead, reasonable accommoda-
tion requires only that the employer assist the employee in locating a program
and give the employee time off to participate in it. Id. Once an employee en-
rolls in a rehabilitation program, the employer has an obligation to provide
the employee with a reasonable period of time to demonstrate success before
taking adverse action. Keels v. Department of the Navy, 9 M.S.P.B. 19 (1981).
Additionally, the Merit System Protection Board has found that an employer
should have canceled the proposed removal action and offered the employee
another chance once the employee joined Alcoholics Anonymous and gained
control over his alcoholism. Ruzek v. General Servs. Admin., 7 M.S.P.B. 437
(1981).
107. Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D.D.C. 1985). But cf.
supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority of
courts permit disciplining disability-caused misconduct).
In Walker, a former government employee, who was a rehabilitated alco-
holic, brought suit against the Department of Defense for discriminating
against him as a disabled individual. 600 F. Supp. at 759. Walker alleged
that his employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation for his alcohol-
ism when it combined pre-treatment, alcohol-induced misconduct with post-
treatment misconduct to calculate the punishment for the post-treatment
misconduct. Id. The court ultimately rejected the employer's assertion that it
made sufficient reasonable accommodations by reducing the initial proposed
removal to a ten-day suspension and then allowing him to participate in a
government-affiliated alcohol program. Id. at 762.
Instead, the court found that a reasonable accommodation entailed forgiv-
ing the past alcohol-induced transgressions in proportion to Walker's willing-
ness to undergo, and favorable response to, treatment. Id. Further, "tulse of
pre-treatment records conceded to be attributable to alcohol abuse for disci-
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v. Carlucci,"°8 a federal district court held that reasonable ac-
commodation of a rehabilitating alcoholic should include ex-
pungement of any record" 9 of the employee's misconduct and
any resulting discipline from the individual's personnel file."0
The court justified the expungement of records by noting that
references to misconduct and disciplinary action would ad-
versely affect an individual's ability to gain employment in the
future."' Labeling the information in the employee's files
prejudicial, the court concluded that the prejudice the em-
ployee would suffer outweighed any governmental purpose in
preserving that information."I2 Accordingly, the employee was
entitled to expungement of all references to misconduct and to
disciplinary actions incurred because of her substandard per-
formance while disabled by alcoholism.11
In contrast, other courts have held that employers should
be able to consider the past history of all employees and appli-
cants, including rehabilitated alcoholics. 114 In Office of the
plinary purposes is inconsistent with legislative perception of alcoholism as a
disease." Id. The court noted that knowledge that an employer may resurrect
alcohol-related infractions for future punishment may well be a disincentive
for the alcoholic employee to enter, continue, or complete necessary treat-
ment. Id.
108. 731 F. Supp. 1119 (D.D.C. 1990).
109. The federal courts' power to order the expungement of government
records is well-established where necessary to vindicate rights promised by
the Constitution or by statute. Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). Specifically, courts may order expungement if
the information in the record would adversely affect a guaranteed right in the
future. Id. at 1236. Such a right may exist if the information is inaccurate,
was acquired by fatally flawed procedures, or is prejudicial without serving
any proper governmental purpose. Id. Given the enormous power courts may
exert through expunging records, courts should exercise that power with great
discretion and caution. Id.
110. See Callicotte, 731 F. Supp. at 1121-22 (granting plaintiffs motion to
expunge from her personnel files adverse information, including charges of
misconduct and disciplinary actions incurred because of her substandard per-
formance while disabled). Callicotte was an employee at the Department of
Defense who suffered from alcoholism and severe depression. Id. at 1120.
After successfully completing a treatment program, she suffered a relapse and
subsequently received a Notice of Removal. Id. The notice specifically in-
cluded Callicotte's disciplinary record dating back to before she entered re-
habilitation. Id.
111. Id. at 1122.
112. Id. at 1121-22.
113. Id.
114. See Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (arguing
that an employer may consider past personnel records, absenteeism, disrup-
tive, abusive, or dangerous behavior, violations of rules and unsatisfactory
work performance of all applicants, including drug addicts and alcoholics).
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Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices (SSA), 5 the Federal Circuit declined to adopt the
reasoning in Callicotte"6 and held that reasonable accommo-
dation of an alcoholic employee does not include expungement
of records or forgiveness of past misconduct." 7 The court de-
termined that giving an employee "a fresh start" was inappro-
priate and unnecessary as a reasonable accommodation be-
cause it was actually a "retroactive" accommodation in the
sense that it concerned behavior in the past before the em-
ployee disclosed his alcohol problem and before the employer
was aware of the disability." Since the ADA requires that an
employer be aware of the disability before the duty to accom-
modate arises, 9 the court concluded that expunging records
was not a reasonable accommodation.' 20
II. THE COURTS' FAULTY TREATMENT OF DISABILITY-
CAUSED MISCONDUCT
The inconsistency and ambiguity of the present judicial
approach to disability-caused misconduct under the ADA
leaves employers without specific guidelines for disciplining
employees for such misconduct. Courts have failed to set forth
a consistent and cogent approach because they have not made
important distinctions among different types of misconduct.
Moreover, by allowing employers to discipline prior disability-
caused misconduct, courts have ignored congressional intent
and the policy reasons behind the ADA.
A. GENERATING INCONSISTENCY AND AMBIGUITY
1. Failing to Differentiate Misconduct That Is Directly Caused
by a Disability from Misconduct That Is Only Related to a
Disability
Courts have suggested, but failed to state explicitly, that
in some cases the causal connection between a disability and
resulting misconduct may be strong enough to warrant the
115. 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
116. Id. at 1108.
117. See id. (holding that expunging records is not a reasonable accommo-
dation but a retroactive accommodation, which the ADA does not require).
118. Id. at 1107.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
120. SSA, 95 F.3d at 1107.
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conclusion that the employer did not act on the basis of the
misconduct, but on the basis of the disability that directly
caused the misconduct.1 21 They have also implied that the
causal connection is dispositive and that the Rehabilitation Act
and ADA should protect disability-caused misconduct. 22 The
logical inference from these courts' reasoning is that a direct
and strong chain of causation between the disability and the
resulting misconduct protects the employee from discharge
based on the misconduct. Yet, courts have failed to state these
implications and logical inferences explicitly.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit in Despears v. Milwau-
kee County123 permitted an employer to terminate an alcoholic
maintenance worker after the employee's fourth conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol. 124 The court admitted
that "[i]f [by] being an alcoholic he could not have avoided be-
coming a drunk driver, then his alcoholism was the only cause
of his being demoted."125 In the context of drunk driving, how-
ever, the court did not believe that Despear's alcoholism was
the sole cause of his misconduct because his decision to drive
while drunk was also a contributing cause.1 26 Nevertheless,
there are certainly instances when an employee's alcoholism is
the sole and direct cause of misconduct, and dismissal based on
that misconduct would be discriminatory and thus impermis-
sible. 2 7 By failing to state such a holding explicitly, however,
the court did not distinguish between misconduct that is di-
12L See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the
courts rejected discrimination claims because the misconduct did not directly
result from the employee's disability); supra text accompanying note 99
(discussing a case in which the Seventh Circuit suggested that an employer
may not lawfully discipline an employee's misconduct if the disability directly
caused the misconduct). These cases reflect some courts' views that employee
misconduct that is a'direct result of a disability is protected under the ADA.
This view contrasts with the majority approach, which holds that employers
may discipline misconduct, even though it directly results from a disability.
See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (reviewing the majority stance
that an employer may discipline disability-caused misconduct).
122. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text (relating examples of
courts that rejected employee discrimination claims because the causal rela-
tionship between the disability and the misconduct was too attenuated).
123. 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 637.
125. Id. at 636.
126. Id.
127. For example, an employee who verbally insults a customer during an
alcoholic blackout engages in misconduct caused solely and directly by alcohol-
ism.
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rectly caused by a disability, which should be protected, and
misconduct that is only related to a disability, which employers
should be able to discipline.
The affirmative defense of addiction1 2 also suggests that
courts should treat misconduct that directly results from a dis-
ability differently from misconduct that is only related to the
disability. The addiction defense stems from a belief that the
law should not hold those under the influence of a substance
accountable for offenses committed while they were substan-
tially impaired.'29 Allowing such a defense implies that courts
will "forgive" misconduct if it was directly caused by the dis-
ability of substance abuse. Further, courts that ultimately find
for the employer often make subtle references suggesting that
the outcome may have been different had the misconduct oc-
curred solely because of the disability. 3 °
2. Failing to Distinguish Between Criminal, Egregious
Misconduct and Harmless Misconduct
Courts have consistently emphasized that employers may
act on criminal or egregious misconduct. 3' Permitting employ-
ers to discipline criminal or egregious misconduct is under-
standable and reasonable in light of the employer's legitimate
concern about ensuring the safety of the workplace. 3 2  The
128. See supra text accompanying notes 102-104 (describing the affirma-
tive defense of addiction available to federal government employees who were
discharged for misconduct resulting from substance abuse). Although the af-
firmative defense of addiction exists only under the Rehabilitation Act, this
Note contends that courts should extend the rationale to apply to parties
bringing claims under the ADA. There is no reason to limit the availability of
the affirmative defense to only federal government employees since the two
Acts offer the same protection to employees of both private and public em-
ployers.
129. See supra text accompanying note 104 (noting that the defense of
addiction excuses employees who can demonstrate that their substance
abuse seriously impaired their judgment and thus led to the misconduct).
130. For example, in Despears, the court suggested that an employee who
could show that his alcoholism was the sole cause of the misconduct that re-
sulted in his discharge would prove that the employer acted unlawfully on the
basis of the employee's alcoholism. Despears, 63 F.3d at 636.
131. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (claiming that those who
engage in serious misconduct will not find refuge in the Rehabilitation Act or
the ADA because those laws do not require employers to overlook infractions
of the law).
132. Concerns about workplace safety are costly for employers, and law-
suits for negligent failure to prevent crime represent one of those costs.
Thompson, supra note 76, at 25.
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employer defense of direct threat'3 3 further underscores the
need for employers to consider a disabled employee's history of
violent and dangerous behavior, regardless of whether the mis-
conduct resulted from the disability.
In contrast, concerns about workplace safety do not surface
when the disability-caused misconduct involves harmless and
minor infractions of company policies.'34 The natural corollary
to allowing employers to discharge employees for criminal or
egregious behavior is disallowing discharge for harmless mis-
conduct unless the employer proves that there is a direct threat
to the safety of the employee or others in the workplace. Mis-
conduct like excessive absenteeism or failure to follow company
policies is harmless in that it does not seriously endanger the
safety of the employee or other employees. This type of mis-
conduct does not carry the same sort of dangers that criminal
or violent misconduct does. Courts, unfortunately, have not
taken this logical step.
In Little v. FBI,3 5 the Fourth Circuit rejected an FBI
agent's claim of wrongful discharge when his employer fired
him for drinking on duty.136 The court considered dispositive
the determination of whether Little was terminated because of
his alcoholism or because of his misconduct. 137 After deciding
that misconduct is distinct from status as an alcoholic, the
court concluded that an employer "must be permitted to termi-
nate its employee on account of egregious misconduct, irre-
spective of whether the employee is handicapped."138  The
court's holding left unanswered whether employers should
similarly be allowed to fire employees for harmless misconduct
that results from a disability. This type of ambiguity allows for
inconsistent judicial approaches and leaves employers unsure
of how to discipline harmless disability-caused misconduct.
133. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing the requi-
site elements to prove the employer defense of direct threat).
134. "Harmless and minor" infractions of company policies would, by defi-
nition, exclude any criminal or violent behavior.
135. 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993); see supra note 87 and accompanying text
(noting that the Little court is part of the majority that allows employers to
discipline employees for disability-caused misconduct).
136. Little, 1 F.3d at 256.
137. Id. at 257.
138. Id. at 259.
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B. IGNORING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
1. Failing to Encourage Rehabilitation and Facilitating ADA
Violations
Permitting employers to discipline prior misconduct aris-
ing solely from a disability arguably sanctions discrimination
against the disabled in the workplace on the basis of the dis-
ability. 39 Such discrimination conflicts with the express pri-
mary purpose of the ADA. 4 ° Yet, courts have facilitated such
discrimination by distinguishing between an employee's dis-
ability status and any related misconduct without further dif-
ferentiating between different types of misconduct.14 ' Besides
condoning such ADA violations, the courts' approach also ig-
nores congressional intent to encourage and reward rehabili-
tative efforts.1
42
In Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate
Fair Employment Practices (SSA), the court failed to acknowledge
the employee's voluntary enrollment in a rehabilitation program
for his alcoholism in two ways: 4 1 (1) by allowing the employer to
discipline harmless disability-caused misconduct;'" and, (2) by
keeping the disciplinary history on the employee's record. 45 By
139. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (describing a case that
held that discharge for disability-caused misconduct is the same as discharge
for the disability itself).
140. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing the ADA as a
conscious effort by Congress to eliminate all discrimination against the dis-
abled).
141. See supra Part II.A.1 (arguing that courts have failed to distinguish
misconduct that arises solely because of a disability from misconduct that is
merely related to a disability); supra Part II.A.2 (contending that courts have
not differentiated between disciplining egregious misconduct and harmless
misconduct).
142. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (suggesting that Congress
intended the ADA to protect rehabilitated alcoholics and thereby encourage
rehabilitation).
143. See Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair
Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter SSA]
(indicating that the employee "voluntarily entered a rehabilitation program").
144. The court seemed to accept that a "causal connection existed between
Singer's alcoholism and his attendance problems." Id. This type of miscon-
duct epitomizes harmless misconduct that arises only because of a disability,
which this Note argues should be protected under the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA. See infra Part III.A (explaining this Note's proposal concerning
treatment of disability-caused misconduct).
145. See SSA, 95 F.3d at 1109 (finding expungement of the employee's
disciplinary record unnecessary).
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allowing employers to act on prior disability-caused misconduct
contained in an employee's record, the court's holding inter-
feres with Congress's goal to protect alcoholics who actively
seek treatment.46 Moreover, the court failed to recognize that
any time an employer relies on the record of a disability in an
employment decision, a potential ADA violation arises. 147 The
ADA specifically prohibits employers from relying on an indi-
vidual's record of a disability in the past.148 By preserving an
employee's disciplinary record once the drinking problem was
gone, the court left open the very real probability that future
employers will rely on that record.
2. Distorting the Reasonable Accommodations Requirement
By calling the order to expunge records a "retroactive" ac-
commodation, the SSA court deemed it unreasonable and in-
compatible with the reasonable accommodation requirement.1
49
The SSA court never explained, however, why a "retroactive"
accommodation could not also be a reasonable accommoda-
tion. 50 Without an adequate explanation of why an accommo-
dation is "retroactive" and thus not reasonable, courts are able
to manipulate the reasonable accommodation requirement.
The courts' ability to change that definition arbitrarily and
summarily reject accommodations without offering any sub-
stantive reasoning is contrary to congressional intent.'
Furthermore, upon closer examination, expungement of
records is not a "retroactive" accommodation. The SSA court
found that ordering a "fresh start" and expunging records was
retroactive because it dealt with behavior in the past, when the
146. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 333 (listing alcoholism as a disorder covered under the ADA);
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989)(same).
147. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (setting forth that one of the
definitions of a "disability" under the ADA is having a record of such impair-
ment in the past).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(2) (1994) (defining "disability" to include a rec-
ord of an impairment in the past).
149. SSA, 95 F.3d at 1107.
150. See id. at 1104 (labeling the accommodation of a "fresh start" a
"retroactive accommodation").
151. Congress would not want courts to distort the reasonable accommoda-
tions requirement. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (observing
that the reasonable accommodations provision lies at the heart of the ADA).
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employer was unaware of the disability.'52 The court's reason-
ing is faulty, however, because although expunging records
concerns prior misconduct, it provides reasonable accommoda-
tion for the alcoholic employee in the present and the future. 53
Specifically, expunging records of alcohol-caused misconduct
protects an employee from likely discrimination based on past
alcohol abuse when pursuing future employment. Under the
ADA, a reasonable accommodation should look toward the fu-
ture to find the best solution for the employer and the em-
ployee. 5 4  A reasonable accommodation should encompass
more than just enabling the individual to do the job; it should
ensure equal opportunity in the workplace 5 5 Therefore, it is
irrelevant that the employer was unaware of the alcohol abuse
at the time the misconduct took place. Once the employer is
aware of the disability, the duty to accommodate arises. Ex-
punging records reasonably accommodates the disabled em-
ployee's future needs and protects the employee from future
discrimination.
III. TOWARD A CLEAR AND CONSISTENT JUDICIAL
APPROACH: LIMITING PROTECTION OF DISABILITY-
CAUSED MISCONDUCT AND EXPUNGEMENT
OF RECORDS
Courts need a consistent approach toward disciplining
alcohol-caused misconduct. A more effective solution to the is-
sue of alcohol disability-caused misconduct and reasonable ac-
commodation requires a two-step approach. First, courts
should explicitly differentiate between permissible disciplining
of disability-related misconduct and impermissible disciplining
of disability-caused misconduct. This step recognizes that dis-
charge on the basis of disability-caused misconduct is discrimi-
nation on the basis of the disability itself, but allows employers
to act on certain types of disability-related misconduct to pro-
tect their valid business interests. Second, courts should ex-
152. See SSA, 95 F.3d at 1104 (explaining why the expungement of records
constituted a retroactive accommodation).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 108-113 (discussing one case in
which a federal court found reasonable accommodation to counter possible ad-
verse effect on future employment).
154. Hartman, supra note 35, at 927.
155. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text Ojustifying the ex-
pungement of records as a reasonable accommodation because it would guar-
antee a rehabilitating alcoholic equal employment opportunities).
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punge records as a reasonable accommodation, but only when
three conditions are met: (1) the misconduct arises solely and
directly because of the employee's alcoholism; (2) the miscon-
duct is neither violent nor criminal; and, (3) the employee is
willing to enter rehabilitation and eventually becomes success-
fully rehabilitated.
The proposed approach offers three distinct advantages
over the current judicial ambiguity. With new and significant
law like the ADA,156 courts should make every effort to set forth
clear and consistent holdings. Consistent guidelines help both
the employer, who needs to know what actions are permissible
under the ADA, and the employee, who should know of any le-
gitimate discrimination claims. Additionally, allowing the ex-
pungement of records of an alcoholic employee when the mis-
conduct was harmless and directly caused by alcoholism
recognizes the legitimate interests of both the disabled em-
ployee and the employer. 57 The proposed approach also fur-
thers the ADA's goals of encouraging and rewarding rehabili-
tation 5 8 and adheres to established case law on reasonable
accommodations for alcoholic employees, which emphasizes re-
habilitation. 59
156. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (commenting on the
relative newness of the ADA and the increasing ADA litigation).
157. By limiting the reasonable accommodation to those who actively pur-
sue rehabilitation, the proposed approach ensures that alcoholic employees
who do not plan on changing their habits do not get a windfall under the rea-
sonable accommodations provision. An employer may also be relatively cer-
tain that any pertinent information concerning workplace safety remains in
an employee's record because criminal or violent misconduct would not be ex-
punged as a reasonable accommodation of the alcoholic employee.
The proposed approach also does not offend the ADA's premise that em-
ployers need not hire or retain an individual who is not otherwise qualified for
the position. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining that the
ADA only protects "qualified individual[s] with a disability"). By limiting the
accommodation to rehabilitating individuals who would not commit the
harmless misconduct but for their alcoholism, the proposed approach insists
that the individuals be "otherwise qualified."
158. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (identifying the strong pub-
lic policy for encouraging substance abusers to seek rehabilitation).
159. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (positing that reasonable
accommodations of alcoholic employees often revolve around providing them
an opportunity to undergo rehabilitation).
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A. DIFFERENTIATION OF TYPES OF DISABILITY-CAUSED
MISCONDUCT
1. Cause of the Misconduct Matters: Protecting Misconduct
That Is Directly Caused by a Disability
To clarify this unsettled area of law, courts should hold
that disability-caused misconduct is different from disability-
related misconduct. 6 ' Such a distinction would excuse alco-
holic employees only for misconduct that directly arises from
their alcoholism, such as blackouts during which they fight
with customers or other employees.
Courts should consider applying the idea of proximate
cause, as used in determining causation for negligence claims,
to distinguish between disability-caused and disability-related
misconduct. Though the determination of causation may seem
arbitrary, courts have recognized that some sort of line-
drawing is necessary.' 61 Proximate cause is a concept that
"cuts off liability even though there is cause in fact."62 In the
context of disability-caused misconduct, courts should permit
employers to discipline alcoholic employees only when "proxi-
mate cause" is lacking between the alcoholism and the subse-
quent misconduct. Conversely, if the alcoholism is the direct
and primary cause of the misconduct, "proximate cause" exists
and employers should not act on such misconduct.
2. Gravity of the Misconduct Matters: Protecting Harmless
Misconduct
Courts should also recognize that the severity of the mis-
conduct makes a difference and hold that employers should not
terminate a disabled employee when the disability-caused mis-
conduct was harmless. 63 The rationale for allowing employers
to discharge employees who engage in criminal, violent, or oth-
160. See supra Part II.A.1 (reviewing the courts' failure to distinguish mis-
conduct that directly results from the disability from misconduct that is
merely related to the disability).
161. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Daniels, 70 S.E. 203, 205 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1911) (stating that courts, in their "finitude," must deal with cause and
effect in a way that is practical and within the scope of human understand-
ing).
162. JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 285 (9th ed. 1994).
163. See supra Part II.A.2 (outlining the courts' failure to differentiate be-
tween criminal, egregious misconduct and harmless misconduct).
[Vol. 81:16411668
ALCOHOLICS AND THE ADA
erwise egregious misconduct, regardless of whether they are
disabled,'6 does not apply to harmless misconduct like absen-
teeism or minor infractions of company policies.
65  Although
employers may be able to proffer a business justification for
such a discharge, the firing would violate the ADA's strict re-
quirement of providing the employee reasonable accommoda-
tions at the expense of employers.'
66
3. Timing of the Misconduct Matters: Protecting Prior
Disability-Caused Misconduct upon Rehabilitation
Important differences exist between disciplining disability-
caused misconduct when it first occurs and disciplining it after
the employee starts rehabilitation and the misconduct stops.
When employers act on present misconduct, they are disciplin-
ing a problem that an alcoholic employee presently has that
will likely resurface without some treatment. This reasoning
does not apply to the rehabilitated alcoholic because the prob-
lems have stopped.
Additionally, concerns about workplace safety with current
alcoholics'67 do not exist in similar magnitude with rehabili-
tated alcoholics. The direct threat defense requires the em-
ployer to present objective and substantial evidence based on
an individual's current condition 68 before a court will deter-
mine that accommodating an alcoholic employee would be un-
reasonable.169
The Rehabilitation Act and ADA's policy of protecting re-
habilitating and rehabilitated substance abusers 70 also indi-
164. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (conveying the courts'
belief that the ADA does not protect employees who commit criminal acts).
165. See supra Part IIHA.2 (detailing why harmless misconduct does not
involve the same sort of dangers as criminal, violent misconduct).
166. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (asserting that employ-
ers' duty to provide reasonable accommodations for their disabled employees
may require substantial costs).
167. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (observing that em-
ployers may be wary about employing current alcoholics because of workplace
safety concerns).
168. See supra text accompanying note 79 (determining that prior history
of misconduct is not objective evidence).
169. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1996) (discussing proper procedure for
employers to follow in determining whether a disabled employee is a direct
threat to workplace safety).
170. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (proposing that protect-
ing rehabilitated or rehabilitating alcoholics ensures that employers may not
lawfully discriminate against them for past substance abuse).
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cates that courts should treat past misconduct and present
misconduct differently. The Second Circuit specifically noted
that allowing an employer to discharge an employee based on
past substance abuse problems that an employee has overcome
would defeat the Rehabilitation Act's goal of rewarding rehabili-
tation.7 ' If an employer continues to dredge up prior alcohol-
caused misconduct even after the employee fully recovers from
the past alcohol abuse, there is little incentive for employees to
seek rehabilitation and actively work to overcome the alcohol-
ism."' Hence, for policy reasons, courts should adopt the Sec-
ond Circuit's reasoning 73 and prohibit disciplinary action for
prior disability-caused misconduct once the employee enters
and completes a rehabilitation program.
Practical reasons also suggest that employers should be
cautious about relying on prior disability-caused misconduct to
fire an employee. One of the statutory definitions of a disabil-
ity under the ADA is having a record of a disability.174 The
EEOC indicated that an employer would violate the ADA by
relying on a record that indicates that an individual has or had
a substantially limiting impairment. 7 1 When a record identi-
fies both the disability and the misconduct arising from that
disability and an employer then uses the prior disability-
caused misconduct from the employee's record in a way that
adversely affects the employee's career, 76 it would be difficult
for the employer to deny that it acted on the basis of the em-
ployee's history of a disability.
This practical concern is even more significant in light of
the ADA's hope of combating preconceived notions about the
171. Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 518 (2d Cir.
1991).
172. See Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D.D.C. 1985) (suggest-
ing that an alcoholic employee's knowledge that an employer may resurrect
alcohol-related infractions for future punishment may act as a disincentive to
obtain necessary treatment).
173. In Teahan, the Second Circuit followed the reasoning in Walker and
concluded that the Rehabilitation Act is clearly designed to prevent employers
from retroactively punishing rehabilitated or rehabilitating alcoholics. 951
F.2d at 518. The court's conclusion suggests that employers should not rely
on pre-treatment alcoholic problems for disciplinary purposes.
174. 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B) (1994).
175. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1996).
176. Examples include an employer denying a promotion based on prior
misconduct in the employee's record or a prospective employer denying a po-
sition to an applicant because of such information.
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disabled and protecting those with a history of a disability,
1 77
especially with treatable disorders like alcoholism. Consider-
ing Congress's goal of ending discrimination against the dis-
abled based on such preconceived notions and stereotypes,
7 8
employers should not accept the stereotype of "once an alco-
holic, always an alcoholic." Employers who continue to rely on
prior misconduct in assuming that the alcohol-caused miscon-
duct will return are discriminating against the disabled on the
basis of that stereotype.
B. LIMITED EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS AS A REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION OF AN ALCOHOLIC EMPLOYEE
To ensure that employees with a record of a disability will
continue to have equal opportunities for future employment,
courts should find that expungement of records of prior alcohol-
caused misconduct is a reasonable accommodation. When
prejudicial information remains in an individual's file, 17 9 dis-
crimination by employers inevitably follows. The proposed ap-
proach guarantees that rehabilitated and rehabilitating alco-
holics will not continue to face unlawful discrimination by
employers because of prior alcohol-caused misconduct. 8 ° None-
theless, the ADA also takes into account the employer's valid
interests.' Because courts must weigh the legitimate and ma-
177. See supra note 54 (addressing Congress's intent that the ADA combat
mistaken, but common, views about the disabled); supra notes 83-85 and ac-
companying text (affirming that the ADA covers rehabilitated and rehabilitat-
ing substance abusers to prevent employers from discriminating against such
individuals on the basis of past substance abuse).
178. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (finding that Congress en-
acted the ADA as a comprehensive national mandate to end all discrimination
against disabled individuals).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 111-112 (contending that refer-
ences to disability-caused misconduct and disciplinary action in an individ-
ual's file were prejudicial).
180. The District Court for the District of Columbia was concerned about
exactly that when it condoned expunging records in Callicotte v. Carlucci, 731
F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (D.D.C. 1990). The Callicotte court feared that the em-
ployee would face prejudice and discrimination in the future if such action
was not taken. Id. at 1122. The action was thus a reasonable accommodation.
Id. at 1121-22. Other courts have expressed similar concerns. See supra
notes 174-176 and accompanying text (arguing that employers who base dis-
ciplinary action on a record of disability-caused misconduct would have diffi-
culty proving they did not rely on the individual's history of a disability).
181. See supra text accompanying note 48 (calling the Title I provisions an
attempt to balance the interests of employers with the interests of disabled
employees). The availability of the employer defenses also suggests that the
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terial interests of both the employer and the disabled em-
ployee, 18 2 expunging records as a reasonable accommodation is
appropriate only under the following conditions.
1. Permitting Expungement Only for Misconduct Arising
Solely Because of the Disability
Courts should only allow the expungement of records for
misconduct that directly and solely occurred because of the
employee's alcoholism. 18 3 This limitation prevents employees
from demanding that employers remove all types of discipline
from their records regardless of how attenuated the connection
to the alcoholism. 84 A strong link between the disability and
the misconduct also ensures that the misconduct will not likely
reappear once the individual receives proper treatment. Once
the disability, the sole cause of the misconduct, disappears, the
misconduct should also disappear.
2. Retaining Information of Any Violent or Criminal Behavior
An employer has a valid interest in maintaining the safety
of the workplace. 85 Eliminating all record of violent and
criminal behavior'8 6 for rehabilitated or rehabilitating alcohol-
ics would certainly affect an employer's ability to monitor
workplace conditions. In situations where the rehabilitated or
rehabilitating employee's conduct was egregious, an employer
should be able to raise a valid direct threat defense and refuse
to expunge records. Admittedly, allowing an employer to re-
tain information about a rehabilitated or rehabilitating alco-
holic's violent or criminal past behavior may allow employers
ADA is concerned about employers' substantial and legitimate business inter-
ests. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text (explaining the employer
defenses of undue hardship and direct threat).
182. See sources cited supra note 181.
183. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text (positing that courts
should distinguish between disability-caused misconduct and disability-related
misconduct).
184. Many courts have noted this concern. See supra notes 99-101 and ac-
companying text (reviewing courts' rejections of discrimination claims based
on disability because the misconduct was too removed from the actual disabil-
ity).
185. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing an em-
ployer's ability to discharge or discipline an employee who poses a direct
threat to the safety of the employee or others in the workplace).
186. Denying expungment of records of criminal or violent misconduct is
consistent with this Note's proposal that courts should treat disability-caused
misconduct according to the severity of the misconduct.
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to act impermissibly based on stereotypes about the disabled,
which is arguably inimical to the ADA's larger goal of defeating
such harmful stereotypes. 18 7 A balancing of interests, however,
necessitates such a result. When based on substantial evi-
dence, the employer's interest in maintaining a safe work envi-
ronment outweighs the employee's interest in eliminating all
record of past violent or criminal conduct.
3. Requiring Rehabilitation Before Expunging Records
Finally, courts should only allow the accommodation of ex-
punging records in proportion to both the alcoholic employee's
willingness to undergo rehabilitation and favorable response to
such treatment. 88 An employer need not immediately expunge
an alcoholic employee's file once made aware of the employee's
alcohol problem. By initially offering to expunge an individ-
ual's file, however, the employer provides the alcoholic em-
ployee with a real incentive to enter, continue, and complete
rehabilitation. Accordingly, once the alcoholic employee seeks
treatment, the employer should offer to expunge the employee's
file of any record of the alcohol-caused misconduct and even-
tually expunge records if the treatment is successful.189
CONCLUSION
Because the ADA is still relatively new law, courts have
not yet developed a judicial stance on how to interpret the
statute. Determining what constitutes a reasonable accommo-
dation of the alcoholic employee has perplexed employers and
courts alike, especially in the context of disciplining misconduct
that arises from alcoholism. In answering this question, courts
have failed to identify key distinctions between disability-caused
misconduct and disability-related misconduct and between
harmless misconduct and criminal, egregious misconduct. As a
result, courts' analysis of whether a given accommodation is
187. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (considering the ADA's ob-
jective of preventing discrimination against individuals on the basis of irra-
tional fears or patronizing attitudes).
188. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (contending that a reason-
able accommodation for an alcoholic employee means forgiving prior miscon-
duct, but only in proportion to the individual's willingness to enter treatment
and the extent of the treatment's success).
189. Although "successful" rehabilitation may be defined in various ways,
an employee should only be allowed to claim "successful" rehabilitation when
the alcohol-caused misconduct no longer recurs.
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reasonable tends to be inconsistent and ambiguous. This is
particularly apparent in cases requiring the expunging of rec-
ords of disability-caused misconduct as a reasonable accommo-
dation of the disabled employee.
A more effective approach involves first differentiating be-
tween permissible disciplining of disability-related misconduct
and impermissible disciplining of disability-caused misconduct.
Under this step, courts should allow employers to act on crimi-
nal, egregious misconduct, but not harmless behavior. Courts
should apply those same categories when considering expung-
ing files as a reasonable accommodation of an alcoholic em-
ployee. Namely, courts should limit the accommodation to in-
stances when the misconduct arose solely because of the
employee's alcoholism and the misconduct was neither violent
nor criminal. The availability of the accommodation should
also correlate to the individual's willingness to enter an alcohol
treatment program and to the eventual successful completion
of the program. Limiting the accommodation to these situa-
tions best comports with the primary ADA goals of encouraging
rehabilitation, protecting the disabled from employment dis-
crimination, and balancing the needs of the disabled employee
with the legitimate interests of the employer.
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